On December 15, 2022, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence will release a declassified report on the IC's posture to support global health security policymakers, how the IC performed in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, and where we need to go from here.

Although many of the changes that the Committee recommends for the IC are classified and must remain so, below are places in the unclassified text that discuss recommendations. Quotations are from the unclassified report text.

ODNI Needs a Dedicated Center for Global Health Security

The Committee recommends the creation of a designated center in ODNI with a global health security mission. (p. 15) "By increasing the number of analysts writing on global health security, those analysts will help create more of a market for collection to feed their analysis – and by supporting global health security policymakers and demonstrating the value that intelligence collection will bring to them, that market will continue to deepen." (p. 62 n. 158)

"Arising out of oversight for this report, in the FY 2021 Intelligence Authorization Act, Congress re-scoped the mission of NCBC to more explicitly take biological threats into account. Implementation of the Committee's changes have been slow. Nevertheless, the Committee remains committed to institutionalizing and centralizing key responsibilities it had already assumed on behalf of the IC in this space." (p. 16 n. 41)

The Committee has expanded the National Counterproliferation Center's mission to manage the mission of "all intelligence activities pertaining to biosecurity and foreign biological threats." Notwithstanding that down payment, further change is necessary.

The IC Must Invest in Open Source Intelligence

"Pandemics are one example of national security crises that emerge from the massed actions of a multitude of people." To better understand these problems "it is incumbent on the IC to resource and empower its agencies to take chances on emerging technologies that can finally deliver reliable, big data-driven OSINT tools." (p. 60)

The IC Must Develop the Capability to Pivot Collection Faster When a New Disease Emerges

Even though public health authorities were the first indication of COVID-19, "the IC still had a role to play in the developing crisis: to quickly pivot both its collection and analysis to keep policymakers informed of the emerging threat, in particular any obfuscation by the Chinese government, as it addressed the crisis domestically. Collection pivoted slowly" and the IC "should make improvements to pivot even faster in the face of the next disease event." (p. 58)

Additional Resources and Support for NCMI Is an Urgent Priority

"Properly supporting NCMI is an urgent intelligence need and should be a top priority of the Director of the DIA and the DNI. Ending the cycles of crisis and complacency in global health security requires devoting resources and the attention of senior IC officials to the parts of the community needed to protect the country from an emerging health security crisis. NCMI is at the forefront of those efforts; that it performed as well as it did with the capabilities and resources given to it is a testament to the dedication of its people. IC senior leadership and the Congress must ensure that NCMI has the support that it needs to improve its performance to get ready for the next pandemic." (p. 15)

The IC Should Better Integrate into the Public Health Agencies

"Simply put, public health entities and the IC, not often natural collaborators, must better complement each other's discrete, invaluable missions. The public health community will appropriately have the lead on pandemic preparedness, with intelligence playing a supporting role. Optimized integration between the two communities is vital." (p. 59)

IC's Culture Must Recognize that Health Security is National Security

"The Intelligence Community has not recognized that health security is national security – and has not made organizational changes to make that realization manifest. The Intelligence Community has a culture and human capital incentive structure that focuses disproportionately on well known 'hard threats' – like adversary plans and intentions or the threats from foreign militaries – at the expense of so-called 'soft threats' like those arising out of pandemic disease, climate change, or mass migration. … Senior Intelligence Community officials have consistently failed to set a culture at their agencies that prioritize 'soft' issues commensurate with the actual threat those issues pose to U.S. national security and economic well-being. Significant changes in IC culture, its human capital management, and its resource prioritization are necessary to focus on *all* the threats we face." (p. 61)

The IC Must Create a Sustainable Demand Signal for Collection on Global Health Security

"If we do not create a persistent, sustainable demand signal for collection on global health security and pandemic preparedness, we will remain blind to emerging disease threats." (p. 63)